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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of FERNANDO NARANJO,
Petitioner,
-against-

NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI ## 01-1 1-ST2934 Index No. 5010-1 1
Appearances:

Fernando Naranjo
Inmate No. 02-A-3 120
Petitioner, Pro Se
Bare Hill Correctional Facility
181 Brand Road
Caller Box # 20
Malone, NY 12953
Eric T. Schneiderman
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Respondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Cathy Y. Sheehan,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)
DECISION/ORDER/J CI DGMENT

George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice

The petitioner, an inmate at Bare Hill Correctional Facility, commenced the instant
CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated May 17,20 10
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to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. In 1995 the petitioner was given a sentence
of five years to life, upon conviction of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled
substance 2”d degree. He was later paroled to deportation to his native country, Columbia.
He subsequently reentered this country illegally. In 200 1 he committed the instant offense,
robbery in the first degree. In 2002 he was convicted of that charge, and given a determinate
sentence of eight years as a predicate felon.‘
Among the many arguments set forth in the petition, the petitioner contends that the
Parole Board failed to consider the appropriate factors under Executive Law

5 2594; that

because he was granted a certificate of earned eligibility, he is entitled to a presumption in
favor of early release; that the Parole Board failed to give meaningful consideration to his
sentencing minutes; that he has already served time in excess of the appropriate guideline
range; that he has an excellent institutional record, including programming; that the Parole
Board failed to provide guidance or recommendations to enable him to obtain release in the
future; that the determination was the result of an unofficial executive policy to deny parole
to violent felony offenders; and that there is no rational basis to hold him for an addition
twenty four months.
The determination of the Parole Board recites as follows:
“Denied 24 months, March 20 12. Notwithstanding the EEC,
after a review of the record and interview, the panel has
determined that if released at this time, there is a reasonable
probability that you would not live and remain at liberty without
again violating the law and your release would be incompatible

I

Because a period of post-release supervision was not imposed at that time, the petitioner

was brought hnck fnr re-xnt.=ncin:;on Maj 21,2010. The smiwcing court adhered to the eight

year determinate term, but did not add post-release supervision.
2
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with the welfare of society. This decision is based on the
following factors: your instant offense is robbery in the first
degree in which you produced a knife, acted in concert,
thrcatened, beat and kicked the victim and when you found him
later he was assaulted and threatened again. Your record dates
back to a 1995 felony drug case. Note is made of your
programming, disciplinary record, sentencing minutes and all
other required factors. Despite being on life parole and here
illegally after deportation you continue to engage in serious
felonious conduct. Parole is denied.”

As stated in Executive Law $259-i (2) (c) (A):
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect
for law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational
education, training or work assignments, therapy and
interactions with staff and inmates; (ii) performance, if any, as
a participant in a temporary release program; (iii) release plans
including community resources, employment, education and
training and support services available to the inmate; (iv) any
deportation order issued by the federal government against the
inmate while in the custody of the department and any
recommendation regarding deportation made by the
commissioner of the department pursuant to section one hundred
forty-seven of the correction law; (v) any statement made to the
board by the crime victim or the victim’s representative, where
the crime victim is deceased or is mentally or physically
incapacitated; (vi) the length of the determinate sentence to
which the inmate would be subject had he or she received a
sentence pursuant to section 70.70 or section 70.71 of the penal
law for a felony defined in article two hundred twenty or article
two hundred twenty-one of the penal law; (vii) the seriousness
o f the nffenw with diw cotwideration to thc typc of ~~‘iitc‘iicc,
length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing court.
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the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the pre-sentence
probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating and
aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior to
confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the
nature and pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous
probation or parole supervision and institutional confinement.”
(Executive Law 92594 [2] [c] [A]).
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requirements, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept.,
20041; Matter of Collado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 92 1 [3d Dept.,
200 11). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part

of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of
Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which
to disturb the discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v.
New York State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021).
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offense, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner’s possession of an earned eligibility certificate, his institutional
programming, his disciplinary record, and his plans upon release. The decision was
sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and it
satisfied the requirements of Executive Law $259-i (see Matter of Siao-Pao, 11 NY3d 773
[2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 20 1 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v.
New York State Evisinn n f P a r n k , 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is p o p
4
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fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate‘s crimes and their
violent nature (see Matter of Matos v New York State Board of Parole, 87 AD3d 1 193 [3d
Dept., 201 13; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the
inmate’s criminal history (E Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971;
Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The Parole Board is not
required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in determining
the inmate’s application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Matos v New York
State Board of Parole, supra; Matter of Young; v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d
1681, 1681-1682 [3rdDept., 20101; Matter of Wise vNew York State Division ofparole, 54
AD3d 463 [3rdDept., 20081). Nor must the Parole Board recite the precise statutory language
set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law

6 2594 (2) (c) (A) (see Matter of Silvero v

Dennkon 28 AD3d 859 [3rdDept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere appropriate the Board

9--

may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the
crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history,
together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and
remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible
with the welfare of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the]
crime as to undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division
of Parole_, 3 AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law 52594 [2] [c] [A], other

citations omitted).
It is well settled that receipt of a certificate of earned eligibility does not serve as a
guarantee ofrclcxc (2lnttcr.

i , j f & ! ! . ~ w ~
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Dept., 20061; Matter of Pearl v New York State Divisiori of Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 [3rd
Dept., 20061).
The record does not support petitioner's assertion that the decision was predetermined
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument (see Matter of
Lue-Shing v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827,828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter of Perez v State of New
York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293
AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Little v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rdDept., 20051,
Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rdDept., 20061; Matter of Motti v Dennison,
38 AD3d 1030, 103 1 [3rdDep., 20071; Matter of Garofolo v Dennison, 53 AD3d 734 [3rd
Dept., 20081; Matter of MacKenzie v Dennison, 55 AD3d 1092, 1193 [3rdDept., 20081).
Petitioner's argument that the Parole Board is required to advise petitioner andor
provide guidance with regard to the programs he should take, or rehabilitative efforts he
should engage in to increase his chance for release at a future parole interview has no merit

L
see Executive Law 0 2594 [2] [a]; 9 NYCRR $ 8002.3; Boothe v Hammock, 605 F2d 661
[2"dCir, 19791; Matter of Freeman v New York State Division of Parole, 21 AD3d 1 174 [3rd
Dept., 20051).
With respect to petitioner's argument that he has served time in excess of the parole
guideline range (see9 NYCRR 800 1.3), the guidelines "are intended only as a guide, and are
not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many circumstances of each individual
case" (see, 9 NYCRR 800 1.3 [a]; Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division of Parole,
290 AD2d 907, 908 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Rodriguez v Evans, 82 AD3d 1397 [36

6
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Dept., 201 11). Thus, the Court finds that this does not serve as a basis to overturn the
Board's decision.
Petitioner's claims that the determination to deny parole is tantamount to a
resentencing, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clauses's prohibition against multiple
punishments are conclusory and without merit (see Matter of Bockeno v New York Stak
Parole Board, 227 AD2d 75 1 [3rdDept., 19961; Matter of Crews v New York State Executive
Department Board of Appeals Unit, 281 AD2d 672 [3rdDept., 20011; Matter of Evans v
Dennison, 13 Misc3d 1236A, [Sup. Ct., West. Co., 20061; Matter of Kelwasinski v Paterson,
80 AD3d 1065, 1066 [3d Dept., 201 13; Matter of Carter v Evans, 81 AD3d 1031,1031 [3d
Dept., 201 11). The fact that an inmate has served his or her minimum sentence does not
confer upon the inmate a protected liberty interest in parole release (see Matter of Motti v
Alexander, 54 AD3d 11 14, 11 15 [3rdDept., 20081). The Parole Board is vested with the
discretion to determine whether release was appropriate notwithstanding the fact that the
sentencing court set the minimum term of petitioner's sentence

(e
Matter of Silmon v

Travis, 95 NY2d 470,476 [2000]; Matter of Gomez v New York State Division of Parole,
87 AD3d 1197 [3d Dept., 201 13; Matter of Cody v Dennisw, 33 AD2d 1141, 1142 [3rd
Dept., 20061 lv denied 8 NY3d 802 [2007]; Matter of Burress v Dennison, 37 AD3d 930 [3rd
Ckpt., 20071).
Although the petitioner maintains that the Parole Board failed to consider the
sentencing minutes, said minutes were a part of the record under review, and were
specifically mentioned during the parole interview. As such, the argument has no merit.

7
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determinant sentence for robbery in the first degree, that the Parole Board exceeded its
authority in holding him for twenty four months, In the Court's view, this argument ignores
the fact that the petitioner was still serving the 1995 sentence for which he received five
years to life, and that parole would have been automatically revoked with regard to that
sentence upon his 2002 conviction of robbery first degree (see Executive Law 9 2594 [3] [d]
[iii]; Tineo v New York State Division of Parole, 14 AD2d 949 [3d Dept., 20051; Matter of
Meade v Boil&,

67 AD3d 1263 [3d Dept., 20091; Adams v New York State Division of

Parole, 278 AD2d 62 1 [3d Dept., 20001). The Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for
the maximum period (24 months) was within the Board's discretion and was supported by the
record

(see Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd

Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 NY2d 604).
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds
them to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of
lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
The Court observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order,

is sealing all records submitted for in camera review.
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.

Thi.: shall constitute thc dscisiuu,
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tlecision/order/judgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are
being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing.

The signing of this

decision/order/judgment and delivery of this decision/order/judgment does not constitute
entry or filing under CPLR Rule 2220. Counsel is not relieved from the applicable
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.

ENTER
November /6 ,201 I
Troy, New York

Dated:

George B. Ceresia, Jr.
Supreme Court Justice

Papers Considered:

1.
2.

Order To Show Cause dated August 1 1,20 1 1, Petition, Supporting Papers
and Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated October 12,20 1 1, Supporting Papers and
Exhibits
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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of FERNANDO NARANJO,
Petitioner,

-against NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE,

Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding
RJI # 01-1 1-ST2934 Index No. 5010-1 1

SEALING ORDER
The following documents having been filed by the respondent with the Court for in

camera review in connection with the above matter, namely, respondent’s Exhibit B,
Presentence Investigation Report, and respondent’s Exhibit D, Confidential Portion of Inmate
Status Report, it is hereby

ORDERED, that the foregoing designated documents, including all duplicates and
copies thereof, shall be filed as sealed instruments and not made available to any person or
public or private agency unless by further order of the Court.
ENTER
Dated:

November 16 ,201 1
Troy, New York
Supreme Court Justice

